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The Battle of Dinwiddie Court House was fought on March 31, 1865, during the American Civil War at the end of the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign and in the beginning stage of the Appomattox Campaign. Along with the Battle of White Oak Road which was fought simultaneously on March 31, the battle involved the last offensive action by General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia attempting to stop the progress of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant's Union Army (Army of the Potomac, Army of the Shenandoah and Army of the James). Grant's forces were moving to cut the remaining Confederate supply lines and to force the Confederates to extend their defensive lines at Petersburg, Virginia and Richmond, Virginia to the breaking point, if not to force them into a decisive open field battle.〔Bearss, Edwin C., with Bryce A. Suderow. ''The Petersburg Campaign''. Vol. 2, ''The Western Front Battles, September 1864 – April 1865''. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2014. ISBN 978-1-61121-104-7. p. 411.〕 On March 29, 1865, a large Union cavalry force of between approximately 9,000 and 12,000 troopers〔Bearrs, 2014, p. 311.〕 moved toward Dinwiddie Court House, Virginia about west of the end of the Confederate lines and about south of the important road junction at Five Forks, Virginia. Under the command of Major General Philip Sheridan, and still designated the Army of the Shenandoah, the Union force consisted of the First Division under Brigadier General Thomas Devin and the Third Division of Brigadier General (Brevet Major General) George Armstrong Custer under the overall command of Brigadier General (Brevet Major General) Wesley Merritt as an unofficial corps commander, and the Second Division, detached from the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George Crook. Five Forks was a key location for control of the critical Confederate supply line of the South Side Railroad (sometimes shown as Southside Railroad). While Devin's and Crook's divisions reached Dinwiddie Court House in the late afternoon of March 29, Custer's division was protecting the bogged down wagon train about behind the other two divisions. Also on March 29, 1865, the Union V Corps under Major General Gouverneur K. Warren moved to the end of the Confederate White Oak Road Line, the far right flank of the Confederate defenses. Warren's corps seized control of advance Confederate picket or outpost positions and occupied a segment of a key transportation and communication route, the Boydton Plank Road, at the junction of the Quaker Road, as a result of the Battle of Lewis's Farm. After a day of pushing the Union line forward on March 30, Warren's force was driven back temporarily on March 31 by a surprise Confederate attack. The V Corps rallied and regained their position on the Boydton Plank Road, cutting direct communication over the White Oak Road between the Confederate defensive line and Major General George Pickett's task force about west at Five Forks, during the afternoon of March 31 at the Battle of White Oak Road. At the end of the day, the V Corps remained the closest Union infantry corps to Sheridan's position. At the same time on March 31, Sheridan's cavalry force deployed north from Dinwiddie Court House in a movement aimed to occupy Five Forks. Sheridan was thrown on the defensive by an attack by both Confederate infantry and cavalry under Major General George Pickett and Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Sheridan's men gave way at various locations during the day but fought long and hard delaying actions, keeping their organization after withdrawals and inflicting hundreds of casualties on the Confederates. Finally reinforced by Custer with two brigades of his division under Colonels Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr. and Henry Capehart which were brought forward from wagon train guard duty, the Union cavalry divisions at Dinwiddie Court House held their line just north of the town. Sheridan's force appeared to be in peril by nightfall due to the threatening position of the strong Confederate force just outside the village. During the night of March 31, however, Brigadier General Joseph J. Bartlett's brigade of Brigadier General (Brevet Major General) Charles Griffin's First Division of the V Corps, followed hours later by Warren's entire corps, maneuvered Pickett back to Five Forks by advancing on his flank before he could take advantage of his advanced position the next day. By 7:00 a.m., Sheridan had a corps of infantry as well as his cavalry to proceed against Five Forks. The battles at White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House, while initially successful for the Confederates, even a tactical victory at the end of the day at Dinwiddie,〔Winik, Jay. ''April 1865: The Month That Saved America.'' New York: HarperCollins, 2006. ISBN 978-0-06-089968-4. First published 2001. p.79.〕 ultimately did not advance the Confederate position or achieve their strategic objective of weakening and driving back the Union forces or separating Sheridan's force from support. The Confederates suffered at least 1,560 casualties to their dwindling forces in the two battles. The battles of March 31 and the troop movements in their aftermath set the stage for the Confederate defeats and the collapse of Confederate defensive lines at the Battle of Five Forks on the following day, April 1, 1865, and at the Third Battle of Petersburg (also known as the Breakthrough at Petersburg) on April 2, 1865. The evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond on the night of April 2–3 and march west of the Confederate Army, with the Union Army in close pursuit, ultimately led to the surrender of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia after the Battle of Appomattox Court House, Virginia on April 9, 1865. ==Background== During the 292-day Richmond–Petersburg Campaign (Siege of Petersburg) Union General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant had to conduct a campaign of trench warfare and attrition in which the Union forces tried to wear down the less numerous Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, destroy or cut off sources of supply and supply lines to Petersburg and Richmond and extend the defensive lines which the outnumbered and declining Confederate force had to defend to the breaking point.〔Hess, Earl J. ''In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat''. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8078-3282-0. pp. 18–37.〕〔Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. ''Why the South Lost the Civil War''. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. ISBN 978-0-8203-0815-9. pp. 331–332.〕〔Trudeau, Noah Andre. ''The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864–April 1865''. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0-8071-1861-0. p. 18.〕 After the Battle of Hatcher's Run on February 5–7, 1865 extended the armies' lines another , Lee had few reserves after manning the lengthened Confederate defenses.〔Weigley, Russell F. ''A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861–1865''. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 978-0-253-33738-2. p. 433.〕 Lee knew he must soon move part or all of his army from the Richmond and Petersburg lines, obtain food and supplies at Danville, Virginia or possibly Lynchburg, Virginia and join General Joseph E. Johnston's force opposing Major General William T. Sherman's army in North Carolina. Lee thought that if the Confederates could quickly defeat Sherman, they might turn back to oppose Grant before he could combine his forces with Sherman's.〔Greene, A. Wilson. ''The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign: Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion''. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2008. ISBN 978-1-57233-610-0. p. 154.〕〔Calkins, Chris. ''The Appomattox Campaign, March 29 – April 9, 1865''. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1997. ISBN 978-0-938-28954-8. pp. 14, 16.〕〔Hess, 2009, p. 253.〕〔Longacre, Edward G. ''The Cavalry at Appomattox: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations During the Civil War's Climactic Campaign, March 27 – April 9, 1865''. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. ISBN 978-0-8117-0051-1. p. 39.〕 Lee began preparations for the army's movement and informed Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Confederate States Secretary of War John C. Breckenridge of his evaluation and plan.〔Greene, 2008, p. 111.〕〔Trudeau, 1991, pp. 324–325.〕〔Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. ''How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War''. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 978-0-252-00918-1. pp. 669–671.pp. 669–671.〕 Lee was aware that Sherman's army moving through North Carolina might combine with Grant's army at Petersburg if Johnston's army could not stop Sherman and that his own declining army could not hold the Richmond and Petersburg defenses much longer. In support of his plan to hold off Grant as long as possible and then gain at least a time advantage in his planned move, during March 1865, Lee considered and finally accepted a plan by Major General John Brown Gordon to launch an attack on Union Fort Stedman. The objective would be to break the Union lines east of Petersburg, or at least to compel the Union forces to shorten their lines by gaining significant ground in a substantial and damaging attack. This was expected to permit Lee to shorten his lines and send a large force to help Johnston, or if necessary give the Confederates a head start in evacuating Richmond and Petersburg and combining Lee's entire force with Johnston's dwindling army.〔Trudeau, 1991, pp. 337–352.〕〔Greene, 2008, p. 108.〕〔Davis, William C. ''An Honorable Defeat: The Last Days of the Confederate Government''. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2001. ISBN 978-0-15-100564-2. p. 49.〕 Gordon's surprise attack on Fort Stedman in the pre-dawn hours of March 25, 1865 ultimately failed with the Confederates suffering about 4,000 casualties, including about 1,000 captured, which the Confederates could ill afford.〔Trudeau, 1991, pp. 337–352.〕〔Greene, 2008, pp. 114–115.〕 The Union Army lost no ground due to the attack and their casualties were too small a percentage of their force to deter them from further, immediate action.〔Hess, 2009, pp. 252–254.〕〔Keegan, John, ''The American Civil War: A Military History''. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. ISBN 978-0-307-26343-8. p. 257.〕 In response to the Confederate attack on Fort Stedman in the afternoon of March 25, at the Battle of Jones's Farm, Union forces of the II Corps and the VI Corps (Sixth Corps) captured Confederate picket lines near Armstrong's Mill and extended the left end of the Union line about closer to the Confederate fortifications. This put the VI Corps within easy striking distance, about , of the Confederate line.〔Marvel, William. ''Lee's Last Retreat: The Flight to Appomattox''. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-8078-5703-8. p. 11.〕〔Trudeau, 1991, p. 366.〕 After the Confederate defeats at Fort Stedman and Jones's Farm, Lee knew that Grant would soon move against the only remaining Confederate supply lines to Petersburg, the South Side Railroad and the Boydton Plank Road, which also might cut off all routes of retreat from Richmond and Petersburg.〔Greene, 2008, p. 154"〕〔Calkins, 1997, p. 16.〕〔Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. ''How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War''. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 978-0-252-00918-1. pp. 669–671.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Dinwiddie Court House」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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